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ABSTRACT Equipped with various sensors and intelligent systems, modern cars turn into entities with
connectivity, autonomy, and safety. Car rental/car sharing is an innovative transportation concept and integral
in today’s urban living. It enables users to access a fleet of vehicles located throughout cities. Complementing
public transportation, the car-sharing service helps people to meet their transportation needs economically
and in an environmentally responsible manner.When a customer wants to rent a car from a rental company or
an owner wants to share a private car with his/her friends or family members, the customer or the user should
gain admission to the car, such as unlocking the door and starting the engine. In this paper, we proposed
a novel and secure key-sharing system named hierarchical identity-based signature key sharing (HIBS-
KSharing), which consists of key generation, key transmission, and key management (e.g., remote issuing,
revocation of access rights, and their delegation to other users or sharers). We implemented our proposed
system based on Nexus smartphones and near-field communication devices. Compared with existing key-
sharing schemes of car rental/sharing, our proposed HIBS-KSharing system is secure and easily extended.
INDEX TERMS Car sharing, identify based signature, automotive cyber security, NFC communication,
electronic key.
I. INTRODUCTION
Car rental and car sharing [1], [2] are an innovative trans-
portation concept and popular in today’s urban living. They
allow the users to have the freedom of accessing a fleet of
vehicles located throughout cities. In Europe, car sharing
or rental players consists of DriveNow [3], Car2Go [4],
Flinkster, Autolib, CarUnity and Tamyca. Players in
North America include DriveNow, Zipca [5], Turo (formerly
RelayRides [6]), and so on. In Asia-Pacific, there are Orix and
Park24 in Japan, as well as PPzuche and EVCard in China.
Cars may be available at fixed stations which are dedicated
parking spots located around a city, or on a free-floating basis,
which allows users to park their vehicle at any legal spot,
where it awaits the next user.
In Singapore, Car Club [7] was established as the go-to
car rental service for the everyday users. Easily accessible
through a vast interconnected network of hubs across the
island, Car Club features a fleet of cars that caters to the
driving needs of the heart lander. Singapore will launch an
electric vehicle (EV) car-sharing programme in collabora-
tion with Bollor Group by mid-2017, named BlueSG [8].
EVs will be deployed in every single Housing & Develop-
ment Board (HDB) town by 2020, to allow as many residents
as possible to enjoy car-sharing facilities.
Passing physical key to a guest user is a traditional way of
key sharing, which is inconvenient and low efficient. Personal
smartphone is a good alternate choice due to its pervasive-
ness, connectivity and equipment with multiple communi-
cation interfaces (e.g., GSM, WiFi, Bluetooth, and NFC).
Smartphone-based E-Key sharing is a desirable and trending
solution for car sharing and rental. The Car Connectivity
Consortium (CCC), an organization driving global technolo-
gies for phone-centric car connectivity solutions, announced
the publication of a white paper outlining the standard based
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solution for using smart derives as key for cars, which
described how existing standard technologies, such as Global
Platform, GSMA, Bluetooth, and NFC can be used to define
a standard for using smart devices as digital keys for cars.
With the cellular connection, the smartcar could con-
nect and communicate with the remote cloud server and
smartphone Apps, e.g., remote management and diagnosis,
the guest user utilizes cellular network to obtain a digital
key and controls a rental or sharing car. That is, the guest
user utilizes his/her smartphone to send commands to cloud
server, the cloud server verifies the guest identity and mes-
sage integrity (e.g., unlocking/locking door), and forwards
them to the rental or sharing car. The Easycar Club and
Car Club exploit above architecture and system; however,
communication may be delay or disconnection sometime
due to unstable network of urban area. Another solution
is Bluetooth-based system. Owner generates and delivers
E-Key to a guest user with cellular network, then the guest’s
smartphone communicates with car by using Bluetooth pro-
tocol. As the car verifies the legitimacy of E-Key, then the
guest user is authorized to use smartphone app to control
the car. For example, Volvo just takes use of this Bluetooth-
based architecture to make car sharing easy among multiple
owners. However, Bluetooth-based key sharing system has
following two shortcomings. One is that pairing time may
be variable or unacceptable, and the other is that it is hard
to correctly calculate and control the distance of automatic
pairing, such as obstacle objects. It is possible that DoS or
relay attack happens between car and smartphone. The third
solution isWiFi-based solution, which is similar to Bluetooth.
Smartphone connects to Car’s WiFi hotspot and completes
identity verification and message transmission. However,
WiFi-based solution belongs to short range communication
and has several problems, e.g., DOS attacks, relay attacks
and serious energy cost. The last solution is NFC-based
solution. A guest wipes his smartphone NFC device over
car’s NFC interface, transmitting verification information and
commands. For example, BMW and DriveNow car sharing
service advocate NFC communications technology to achieve
car access control, car rental and sharing services [9]. It has
several advantages, e.g., efficiency and independence from
networks. However, key sharing system of existing
NFC-based solutions are not secure and difficult to manage-
ment. For each transmission session, if it uses symmetric key
algorithm, it had to generate a new session key; if it uses
public key algorithm, it has to deal with cumbersome PKI.
In this paper, we proposed a key sharing system for car
rental/sharing services based on hierarchical identity-based
signature, named HIBS-KSharing. The proposed system can
not only be employed by car rental services of companies,
but also be suitable for car sharing of owners of private
cars. Guest users’ E-keys can be remotely issued, revoked,
delegated by companies or owners, then they utilize their
smartphones to access cars with NFC communication
protocol. In addition, authorized guest users may permit
their friends or family members to use the rented or shared
cars after they further generate a new heretical IBS key for
their friends or family members. The proposed heretical key
sharing architecture which consists of root and leafs roles
could be flexible for reality requirements. We implemented
our proposed system under Android smartphone and NFC
devices. Compared with existing key sharing systems, pro-
posed HIBS-KSharing scheme is secure and easily extended.
Our contributions of this paper are as following:
• NFC-based key sharing architecture. Proposed
architecture takes use of NFC protocol to achieve the
communication between smartphone and car. NFC com-
munication depends on physical touch in order to guar-
antee the valid information or data transmission.
• HIBS-KSharing system. Proposed system is suitable for
current business models and ecosystems of car sharing
and car rental. Hierarchical key sharing operation is
conveniences such that it is easily adopted by users
(e.g., company or owner).
• Secure IBC-based protocol. Proposed identity-based
cryptography is secure and lightweight, which satisfies
security and real time requirements.
• HIBS-KSharing system implementation. We imple-
mented proposed system on Android smartphone and
NFC devices, including protocol designing of cryptog-
raphy and NFC, and source code development of server
and client Apps.
Remaining of the paper is organizes as following.
Section II summaries previous key sharing systems of
car sharing and rental. Section III describes the secure
HIBS-KSharing system, i.e., key generation, sharing, revoca-
tion and delegation. Section IV gives the experiment imple-
mentation. Section V are security analysis, performance
evaluation and comparison. The last Section VI draws a
conclusion and future works.
II. RELATED WORKS
For future connected cars, most of car manufactories real-
ized the huge potential market of car sharing or rental,
including locking/unlocking/starting a car, provisioning of
keys, sharing of keys, etc. The main players are General
Motors, Volkswagen, Daimler, RealVNC,HTC, PSA,Honda,
LG Electronics, Hyundai, Alpine, Toyota. In this section,
we will survey existing digital key sharing schemes of car
sharing and rental systems, i.e., digital key/smartlocker [10]
but not physical key, and explain signature-based encryption
and authentication, respectively.
A. KEY SHARING
Authors in [11] proposed a key sharing scheme for vehicles.
They created an innovative vehicle sharing system for electric
vehicles, which can easily be accessed by users with little
required infrastructure and few intermediaries. NFC-based
communication system is also used by car immobilizer. For
example, Bauer et al. [12] proposed the security frame-
work for secure authorization system, which uses public key
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technology to implement delegation of access rights, and the
system is communicated over Bluetooth. Timpner et al. [13]
presented a smartphone-based registration and key deploy-
ment system for Vehicle-to-Cloud communications. The
proposed system addresses how drivers can securely register
their vehicle with cloud services and deploy keys for securing
vehicular communications. The work by Han et al. [14] pre-
sented vehicle-to-mobile pairing protocols, based on various
out-of-band channels such as sound, light, and its assumption
is that the vehicle and the mobile phone to be paired do not
pre-share any secrets. The work most related to this invention
is [15], which also focuses on car sharing and delegation of
access rights. It assumes a trusted server to issue keys for
vehicle access to car owners. In addition, to avoid registering
a car owners authentication key to the car owners vehicle,
a token containing the key (the token can be understood to be
a sealed e-envelope) is also issued and the token can only be
decrypted by the vehicle. In vehicle accessing, authentication
data generated by using the authentication key together with
the token is sent to the vehicle, which then decrypts the token
to get the authentication key, and in turn uses the key to check
against the authentication data. Groza et al. [16] explored the
design and implementation options for a protocol that can be
deployed in a car-sharing scenario where multiple users can
share or gain access rights to the same vehicle. Due to inher-
ent constraints of platform, they keep the protocol simple
and rely on inexpensive symmetric key primitives while still
providing advanced options, e.g., rights sharing capabilities.
Mark Elkins of TrustPoint Innovation Technologies in [17]
proposed a peer-to-peer approach to digital key sharing for
vehicle access control. It depends on PKI architecture to
generate public and private keys, and smartphone and vehicle
take use of NFC or Bluetooth protocol to verify each other.
B. IDENTIFY-BASED CRYPTOGRAPHY POLICY
Identify-based cryptography was firstly designed by
Shamir [18] in 1984. Identify-based cryptography schemes
are within the class of asymmetric key based cryptography.
Instead of generating and using a random public/private key
pairs in a public key cryptosystem such as RSA which is
one of the first practical public-key cryptosystems and is
widely used for secure data transmission. It conceived the
option of utilizing a user’s name or his network address
as a public key, with the corresponding private component
being generated by a trusted key generation centre, called
Private Key Generator (PKG). In fact, any type of identifier,
e.g., telephone number, address, email, and so on, can be
used, so as it can uniquely identify the user and it readily
available to the party that uses it.
The identity-based public key cryptosystem is an alternate
for certificate-based PKI, particularly once economical key
management and moderate security are needed. Compared
to ancient PKI, it saves storage and transmission of public
keys and certificates that is very enticing for devices forming
MANETs. For a protracted time once Shamir revealed his
plan, the event on IBC was terribly slow. The construction
of an identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme was left as an
open problem. Since then, there were numerous attempts to
realise Shamirs vision of identity-based encryption, such as
those in [19]–[24]. However, none of these proposals were
fully satisfactory. Either they did not provide adequate secu-
rity or they were not feasible to implement in practical envi-
ronments. Meanwhile, there were further proposals for IBS
schemes in [25] and [26], also based on the RSA primitive.
Only in 2000, Joux [27] showed that Weil pairing is used
for good by mistreatment it during a protocol to construct
multilateral one-round Diffie-Hellman key agreement. This
was one in all the breakthroughs in key agreement protocols.
After this, Boneh and Franklin [28] conferred at Crypto 2001
Associate in Nursing identity-based secret writing theme sup-
ported properties of linear pairings on elliptic curves, which
is the first absolutely useful, economical and incontrovertibly
secure identity-based secret writing theme.
III. SECURE HIBS-KSHARING SYSTEM
In this section, we will give a detail description of
HIBS-KSharing system. The proposed system can not only
be exploited by company of car sharing and rental, but also
be accepted by owner of private car.
A. SECURE ARCHITECTURE
Figure 1 illustrates the architecture of proposed HIBS-
KSharing system. It consists fours components: KGC (Key
Generation Center) belonging to OEM, UMC (User Man-
agement Center) belonging to the third cloud platform,
KMM (Key Management Module) of car’s on-board system
and SCM (Secure Communication Module) of smartphone
apps. There are different layers of users under the HIBS-
KSharing system. The first layer is owners of private car and
companies of car sharing/rental; the second layer is family
member (or friend) of owner of private car and customers
of car sharing/rental. Under this kind of architecture, com-
pany (owner) and car can communicate information and data
through KGC , company (owner) and customer (user) can
transfer key and information through UMC , and customer
(owner, user) can unlock/lock car with NFC communication.
We will introduce two services, respectively.
B. SERVICE OF CAR SHARING/RENTAL
Assume that a car sharing/rental company is C, a customer
is u and a car is c. Each entity has an unique identity, IDC, IDu,
and IDc, respectively. KGC of OEM has a pair of master
public key mpk and master private key msk for an identity-
based signature scheme. For C, KGC generates a private
key skC using msk based on IDC (see subsection III-E).
Then, KGC delivers skC to C in a secure manner; also,
KGC is responsible for installing IDC into all cars bought
by C.
When a customer u wants to rent a car c from the com-
pany C, the latter will generate a private key sku based on IDu
as well as IDc with the use of skC . sku will be delivered to
u securely via UMC , and KGC also passes IDu to the car c
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FIGURE 1. Architecture of HIBS-KSharing system.
who keeps a white name list containing all valid users for that
particular car.
C. SERVICE OF PRIVATE CAR
Another service is about sharing of private car to family
members or friends, that is, the car owner remotely issues a
digital key to a user (e.g., familymembers or friends), then the
user could access private car with his smartphone. Assume
owner, user, and car are O, u and c, respectively.
When an ownerO firstly purchases his car c,KGC of OEM
generates a private key skO for the car owner based on the
owner’s identity IDO with the master key msk . Then, skO is
delivered to the smartphone of owner O securely, and IDO is
installed into KMM of car’s on-board system. As last, the car
owner can unlock/lock the car c with his smartphone Apps
under the proposed NFC-based authentication and authoriza-
tion protocols.
Similar to the owner O, a user u should also be firstly
required to register his identity and driver licence to UMC
in order to get a valid account/id IDu from UMC . Once the
user obtains his IDu, u can apply an digital sharing key from
the car owner O. By using owner’s private key skO and the
user’s identity IDu, O generates the user key sku for u with
smartphone Apps, and sends sku to UMC which will forward
the key to u in a secure manner (see subsubsection III-D).
On the other hand, KGC offers an interface to O, allowing
O to manage authorization and revocation configuration on
the car c. Specifically, O sends and updates IDu to car c
through KGC in order to add an entry for u in its white
name list. Besides IDu, other authorization information, such
as parameter P (authorized time duration or permitted func-
tions), will be also stored and managed at both KGC and c.
D. SECURE CHANNELS
In this proposed HIBS-KSharing architecture, there are two
segments of secure communication channels, i.e., the secure
channel between KGC and one company/owner, and the
secure channel amongUMC , one company/owner, and autho-
rized users.
1) SECURE CHANNEL BETWEEN KGC AND
COMPANY/OWNER
This channel is mainly used for KGC to securely deliver
private keys to a car owner or a car sharing/rental company
when they purchase cars. The security of the channel can be
established with credential mode. For example, a password
(generated by the OEM, and thus known to KGC) is sealed
and given to the car buyer, i.e., company or private owner. The
car buyer (an owner or company) can authenticate to KGC
with sharing password, and the two sides further negotiate
a secret session key between them by running a password
authenticated key exchange protocol.
2) SECURE CHANNEL AMONG UMC, COMPANY/OWNER,
AND AUTHORIZED USERS
UMC essentially acts as an App server. It is logically a
separate entity from KGC , but in effect it can be managed by
OEM as well. As such, the secure channel between UMC and
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company/owner can be established with the same mechanism
as used between KGC and company/owner. This segment of
secure channel is used by the company/owner to send private
keys of authorized users to UMC which manages users’ keys
(such as delegation or revocation).
When a user u wants to rent a public car from a rental
company or borrows a private car from a car owner, the user
need download and install client App on his/her smartphone,
then submits his/her legal informations (such as, citizen ID,
license or biometric data) to UMC in order to complete user
registration. The registration of UMC will help u to create
a private password. As a result, the secure channel between
UMC and u can be established with the two executing a pass-
word authenticated key exchange protocol, which helps to
guarantee the secure transmission of the private key generated
by the rental company or the car owner.
E. KEY GENERATION AND SHARING
Proposed HIBS-KSharing gives a concrete of hierarchical
identity-based signature scheme to achieve the key sharing.
For simplicity, it assumes that the architecture consists of
three levels of entities. That is, the top level is KGC , the
second level is car owner O or rental company C , and the
lowest level is users u. We prefers HIBS-KSharing to be
implemented over elliptic curves for better performance.
Let G be a cyclic group with prime order q, and g be a
generator of G. Let H (.) denote a cryptographic hash func-
tion. The master public key and master private key possessed
by KGC is mpk = gx and msk = x ∈R Z∗q , respectively.
1) GENERATION OF skO
In order to generate a private key skO for a car ownerO, KGC
selects a random number r ∈R Z∗q , and computes R = gr
and s ≡ r + x.H (R, IDO, car info) (mod q), where IDO
is the identity of the car owner, and car info may contain
information on the car, such as OEM brand, purchased date,
vehicle identification number (VIN) , and so on. The private
key of owner O is thus skO = (R, s). Note that (gs =
R.yH (R,IDO,car info), s) constitutes a public/private key pair for
ElGamal-type digital signature schemes, so that any digital
signature schemes, e.g., Schnorr Signature, can be employed
to issue signatures.
2) GENERATION OF sku
In order to generate a private key sku for a registered and
authorized user. Car owner O initially selects a random
number r ′ ∈R Z∗q , and computes R′ = gr ′ and s′ ≡
r ′+s.H (R′, IDO, IDu, IDc,P) (mod q), where IDO, IDu, IDc
are the identities of the car owner, the user and the car,
respectively; P denotes the authorization policy containing
information, such as authorization duration and place. Note
that (gs
′ = R′.(R.yH (R,IDO,car info))H (R′,IDO,IDu,IDc,P), s′) is a
public/private key pair for ElGamal-type digital signature
schemes.
F. KEY REVOCATION
For the rental/sharing car c, it assumes that a trust storage is
installed, e.g., Trustzone, TMP (Trusted PlatformModule) or
secure element chip. The secure storage of car c maintains a
white name list, which manages the identities (ID) of users,
and stores information of the owner O and other authorized
users u. In order to revoke an authorized user, it simply
concerns that the owner O deletes the entry corresponding
to that particular user from the car’s white name list. Specif-
ically, the owner O sends an revocation requirement of the
user’s key to KGC which also maintains white name list.
KGC further forwards the revocation command to the car c
whose KMM will delete the user identify and information
(e.g., authorization policy) from trust storage.
G. AUTHENTICATION AND AUTHORIZATION PROTOCOL
The owner O or an authorized user u unlocks or locks the car
door by running an authentication and authorization protocol
with the car c. The communication protocol consists of three
steps as follows.
1) FOR OWNER O
Step 1: The owner O sends IDO, car info to the car c to
initiate the protocol.
Step 2: In response, the car c replies a random challenge
chal.
Step 3: The owner O generates a signature Sig(skO, chal)
on chal using skO and then returns Sig(skO, chal) to c. Upon
receipt of the message, the car c verifies the signature, and
unlocks or locks the car door if the signature is valid, other-
wise, c denies the owner or user’s requirement if the signature
is not valid.
2) FOR AUTHORIZED USER u
Step 1: The user u sends IDO, car info, IDu,P to the car c
to initiate the protocol.
Step 2: In response, the car c replies a random challenge
chal.
Step 3: The user u generates a signature Sig(sku, chal) on
chal using sku, and then returns Sig(sku, chal) to the car c.
Upon receipt of the message, the car c verifies the signature,
and unlocks or locks the car door if the signature is valid,
otherwise, c denies the owner or user’s requirement if the
signature is not valid.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
Our simulation experimental environment consists of the
interface of NFC, the server, and the client (App of smart-
phone). Specifically, NFC chip acts as the interface between
the server and the client; the server refers to the car KMM
as a locker controller module; the client (App of smart-
phone) plays the interface of authorized user. The server and
client communicate and verify identities between each other
with the technology of Near Field Communication (NFC)
protocol. We will describe the implementation of the
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proposed system with smartphones and NFC devices as
following.
A. NFC, OPEN LIBRARY, AND PROTOCOL
Since the proposed HIBS-KSharing system takes use of NFC
chips as communication channel, we will explain NFC itself,
two open important libraries and one communication protocol
of NFC.
1) NFC
Near Field Communication (NFC) is an open platform
technology that provides wireless communication between
devices that are compatible with the ISO/IEC 18092 [29] and
ISO/IEC 21481 [30] standards. It was proposed as a unifying
successor for the available RFID technologies. The NFC
standard wraps older RFID modulations like the ISO/IEC
14443 [31], ISO/IEC 15693 [32] and JIS X 6319-4 [33].
There are a number of devices compatible with NFC technol-
ogy like GSM phones and other peripheral computer equip-
ments. NFC consists of two working modes. Firstly, it acts
on reader/writer, a reader feeds, via an electromagnetic field
at the 13,56 MHz frequency, a card including an antenna and
a low power consumption secure microcontroller. Secondly,
it workswith Peer to Peer (P2P), i.e., two devices (the Initiator
and the Target) exchange packets over a 13,56 MHz radio
link. Both devices could manage their own energy resources
in the active mode, or the Target is fed by the Initiator in the
passive mode.
2) LIBNFC
Open-source Libnfc is a software package that works with
most commercially-available NFC readers, which is the first
libre low level NFC SDK and Programmers API released
under the GNU Lesser General Public License.
3) SNEP COMMUNICATION PROTOCOL
The Simple NFC Data Exchange Format (NDEF) Exchange
Protocol (SNEP) is a request or response protocol. A SNEP
client sends a request to a SNEP server, the request contains
following elements, e.g., protocol version, request method,
the length of an information field in octets, and information
field. The purpose of the Simple NDEF Exchange Protocol
is to exchange NDEF messages. NDEF messages are trans-
mitted in the information field of SNEP request or response
messages. Figure 2 illustrates the SNEP Communication
Model.
4) LIBLLCP
Libllcp is an implementation of NFC Logical Link Control
Protocol (LLCP) for libnfc. It is secures P2P sessions due to
the well-known TLS/SSL protocol. LLCP and TLS associ-
ated with a set of rules build the LLCPS protocol. SNEP ser-
vice is over LLCPS, which is used for access control. When
the user taps his NFC ‘‘card’’ against an NFC ‘‘device’’,
a TLS session is opened over the P2P connection. Thereafter
NDEF content is pushed over SNEP.
FIGURE 2. SNEP communication model.
B. HARDWARE
1) SERVER PLATFORM
The NFC device of server consists of three components,
i.e., antennamatching circuit, central processing unit (PN532)
and serial port communication. PN532 is a highly inte-
grated transceiver module for contactless communication at
13.56 MHZ based on the 80C51 microcontroller core. It sup-
ports six different operating modes. The proposed system
adopts ISO/IEC 18092, ECMA 340 Peer-to-Peer operating
mode, and can be connected to an external antenna for data
exchange with the client by PN532 transceiver. Finally, the
server transmits information with the control system of car
by High Speed UART (HSU). In this paper, we take use of a
laptop to simulate the system of car. Figure 3 illustrates the
server platform and process.
FIGURE 3. Server simulation.
2) CLIENT
In experimental simulation environment, any kind of smart-
phones with a NFC sensor can be adopted to act as a client.
We chose one NEXUS 5 (with a NFC sensor) running
Android 6.0.1 and another NEXUS 5 running Android 4.4.4
to verify proposed HIBS-KSharing system. Android 4.0 and
above support a P2P application named ‘‘Android Beam’’,
based on the SNEP (Simple NDEF Exchange Protocol).
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FIGURE 4. Owner demo. (a) Master interface. (b) Put master smartphone close to NFC device.
(c) Client: Communication between owner smartphone and NFC device. (d) Server: Communication
between owner smartphone and NFC device.
C. SOFTWARE
Both server and client are made of four software layers. The
first layer is MAC layer, i.e., NFC controller chip provides
radio framing and MAC facilities, which are specified by the
NFCIP-1 standard. The second layer is the LLCP layer, which
manages P2P sessions. The third layer is a TLS layer, which
utilizes the well-known OPENSSL library on the Initiator
side, and runs in a secure element on the Target side. The
last layer is a SNEP layer, which provides a communication
service for the Initiator and the Target.
After some necessary initiations with libnfc and libllcp,
the server will create an MAC link (MAC and LLCP lay-
ers) in order to wait for communicating requirement from
an approached client. Upon creating NFC channel (TLS
layer), the server opens a secure channel to send a frame
with NFC Data Exchange Format (NDEF) to the client
according to Simple NDEF Exchange Protocol. Because the
NDEF is a general standard data exchange format in NFC,
which was defined by NFC Forum. Hence, the client can
receive and parse the data under NFC protocol. At last,
the client and server send challenges and verify each other.
Figure 4 and Figure 5 illustrate the demonstrations of the
owner and user.
V. EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS
A. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The above hierarchical identity-based signature scheme is
an extension of the identity-based signature scheme from
ISO/IEC 29192-4 standards, which has been proven secure
TABLE 1. Time consuming.
in the random oracle model. In the same way, the security of
proposed hierarchical identity-based signature scheme can be
proven in the random oracle model as well.
The above authentication and authorization protocol is a
simple challenge-response signature based entity authentica-
tion protocol whose security has been well studied. On the
premise of the security of the hierarchical identity-based
signature scheme, security of the authentication and autho-
rization protocol is easily derived.
B. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this subsection, we will present the performance measure-
ments for the authentication protocols.
Under experimental simulation environment, we calcu-
late the time cost and communication cost for proposed
HIBS-KSharing system. Time cost includes transferring time,
signature time, and verifying time as shown in Table I. Trans-
ferring time cost is average 440 ms for each route (including
of initiation, connection/pairing, sending requirements and
receiving data). Verifying time considers both smartphone
and car sides. The signature time under Android Nexus 5
is about 0.54 ms, while the verification time under car side
is about 1.36 ms. Hence, the total time cost of NFC-based
unlock/lock is no more 1 second, which is efficient and real
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FIGURE 5. Guest demo. (a) Master set key for guest. (b) Guest smartphone collects key by NFC protocol.
(c) Client: Communication between guest smartphone and NFC device. (d) Server: Communication
between guest smartphone and NFC device.
FIGURE 6. SNEP header and NDEF package.
time.
The communication cost is the payload of SNEP package
which contains SNEP header and NDEF payload as shown in
Figure 6. Table 2 illustrates the SNEP format. SNEP header
is 6 bytes, while NDEF consist 9 bytes header and various
TABLE 2. Communication overhead.
payload, such as 32 bytes of hash value. Hence, the maximum
communication overhead is about 47 bytes for our SNEP
package.
C. COMPARISON
In this subsection, we give the comparison between pro-
posed system with existing systems. Compared with existing
vehicle-sharing systems which take use of smartphones but
depend on the third parties to delegate and revoke keys. For
example, Enjoy1 and Car Club [7] are the systems which
do not require a membership card to access vehicles. Smart-
phone Apps control the vehicle with a central sever with
following steps. Firstly, commands send by the client are
processed by central server, then central server will forward
above commands to the sharing vehicles. However, delay
may happen due to worse network conditions, which cannot
satisfy real time requirements of lock/unlock door.
Compared with the electronic vehicle access system
in [15]. Firstly, the authentication keys of all the car own-
ers are issued by or known to a trusted third party server,
while proposed HIBS-KSharing system suggests that cars
independently generate their own secret keys and in turn the
1enjoy.enti.com
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corresponding car owners authentication keys. The benefit is
that the car owner controls all secret keys associated with
his/her car. In addition, even if a car is compromised and
the secret key it contains is exposed, no other cars will be
affected. Therefore, there is no a single point of vulnerability
of the entire system. Secondly, the system in [15] essentially
adopts a token-based authentication method, where a car
owner gets the authentication key and delegation key from
the server, along with a sealed e-envelope containing these
keys, which can only be opened by the car; in accessing
the car by the car owners or a delegated users, the sealed
e-envelope must be communicated to the car, together with
the actual authentication data. The sealed envelope adds to the
communication overhead. In comparison, proposed system
performs a hierarchical key generation method for car, car
owners and delegated users. HIBS-KSharing has the same
properties with the system in [15], i.e., do not need to register
the authentication keys of the car owners and the delegated
users to the car, while proposed system further avoid the
redundant communication overhead of the sealed envelope.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
In this paper, we proposed a secure HIBS-KSharing system
for car sharing and rental, which is secure and efficient. With
issued digital keys, authorized users or customers can access
cars with their smartphones. HIBS-KSharing system takes
use of IBS-based scheme to generate keys. In addition, since
proposed scheme is a hierarchical architecture, top level of
authorized users or customers can further generate next level
keys for new users or customers. Our experimental simula-
tion environment is under Android smartphones and NFC
devices, compared with existing digital key sharing systems,
HIBS-KSharing system is an efficient and secure one.
Our future works focus on data security and privacy
for car sharing and rental. Private data include user data
(e.g., behaviour and favourite setting) and car status data
(such as GPS and commends).
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